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For the last two decades, an ever-increasing number
of countries around the world have been turning over
the management authority for irrigation systems from
government agencies to farmer or other local, nongov-
ernmental organizations. This phenomenon is gener-
ally referred to as management transfer or devolution.
Despite the widespread adoption of irrigation
management transfer programs, little information is
available internationally about its impacts. This report
synthesizes the most significant evidence available to
date about the impacts of management transfer pro-
grams on the financial viability of irrigation systems,
the quality of irrigation operations and maintenance,
the physical sustainability of irrigation infrastructure,
agricultural and economic productivity, and the envi-
ronment. Data from 29 studies of irrigation manage-
ment transfer are summarized and evaluated.
More evidence is available in the literature on
operational and financial performance; less evidence
is available on effects of management transfer on
maintenance and economic performance of irrigated
agriculture. The literature shows a mixture of positive
and negative results, while on balance most sources
report positive results, especially in operations and
finance, although the cost of irrigation to farmers of-
ten rises. Agricultural and economic performance tend
not to change much with transfer. Management trans-
fer often results in lower government expenditures for
irrigation.
Although the literature on the subject is becoming
extensive, no clear analytical paradigm has yet
emerged. The literature is a disparate collection of
definitions and methodologies from which it is diffi-
cult to deduce general conclusions or policy implica-
tions. Many writers show a bias in favor of transfer
programs, apparently on philosophical grounds. More
systematic research methods need to be applied with
enough commonality to permit conclusions about im-
pacts and to specify conditions under which transfer
programs could be expected to succeed or not. The
International Irrigation Management Institute and
other organizations are engaged in this task.
The report recommends 12 principles that should
guide future research on the impacts of this important
reform. It concludes with an identification of key re-
searchable propositions about the essential conditions
that should prevail for management transfer programs
to succeed:
• a clearly recognized and sustainable water right
and water service
• infrastructure that is compatible with the water
service and local management capacities
• well-specified management functions and assign-
ment of authority
• effective accountability and incentives for man-
agement
• arrangements for viable and timely conflict reso-
lution
• adequate resources that can be mobilized for irri-
gation management
It is hoped that this report will be useful for
policy makers and planners, technical staff of donor
agencies, and researchers who wish to determine
whether to adopt transfer policies, how to structure
transfer programs, what kind of outcomes to expect,
and how to measure what those outcomes really are.1
Among the key outcomes of the Earth Sum-
mit held in Rio de Janeiro in 1992 were the
recommendations that water should be
treated as an economic good (with a right
attached to it), that water management
should be decentralized, and that farmers
and other stakeholders should play a more
important role in the management of natu-
ral resources, including water (Keating
1993). Increasingly, local management solu-
tions are being sought for global problems
of food and for resource problems (Ostrom
1990). Irrigation management transfer, or
turnover, has become a widespread strategy
in Asia, Africa, and Latin America. In more
than 25 countries governments are reducing
their roles in irrigation management while
farmer groups or private organizations are
taking them over (Vermillion 1992). Most
often, governments pursue management
transfer programs to reduce their expendi-
tures on irrigation, improve productivity,
and stabilize deteriorating irrigation sys-
tems.
The logic often used to justify irrigation
management transfer policies is as follows:
1. Government bureaucracies lack the in-
centives and responsiveness to optimize
management performance. Farmers
have a direct interest in enhancing and
sustaining the quality and cost-effi-
ciency of irrigation management. When
given the authority and incentives to
act collectively, farmers will act to con-
tain the cost of water management
while improving operational perfor-
mance because it is in their direct inter-
est to do so. However, where manage-
ment transfer involves elimination or
reduction of government subsidies, the
cost of irrigation to farmers will in-
crease.
2. When management transfer occurs in a
supportive socio-technical context, im-
proved quality and cost-efficiency of ir-
rigation management will result. This
will normally enhance the profitability
of irrigated agriculture enough to offset
the increased cost of irrigation to farm-
ers.
3. Management transfer will also save
money for the government as it divests
itself of the responsibility to finance rou-
tine costs of operations and maintenance
(O&M) of irrigation systems. The sav-
ings can be used either to reduce gov-
ernment expenditures in the irrigation
subsector or to reallocate funds to other
functions that cannot be handled or fi-
nanced directly by the private sector.
Following this line of reasoning, we can
consider management transfer to be suc-
cessful if it saves the government money,
improves the cost-efficiency of O&M, and
maintains or increases the productivity of
irrigated agriculture for farmers and urban
consumers.




Early efforts to transfer irrigation manage-
ment from the government to farmer orga-
nizations occurred in the USA, France, Co-
lombia, and Taiwan from the 1950s through
the 1970s. Irrigation management transfer
(IMT) became a national strategy in most
developing countries only in the 1980s and
1990s. Chile, Peru, Mexico, Brazil, the Do-
minican Republic, Colombia, Haiti, Senegal,
Mauritania, Niger, Zimbabwe, Tanzania,
Sudan, Somalia, Madagascar, Turkey, Paki-
stan, India, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, Lao
PDR, Vietnam, China, Indonesia, and the
Philippines are among the countries imple-
menting national transfer programs. This
process has been referred to as turnover in
Indonesia and the Philippines, management
transfer in Mexico and Turkey, privatization
in Bangladesh, disengagement in Senegal,
post-responsibility system in China, partici-
patory management in India and Sri Lanka,
commercialization in Nigeria, and self-man-
agement in Niger.
Given the extent to which management
transfer is being implemented worldwide, it
is remarkable how little information is
available internationally about the results of
transfer programs. It remains to be seen
whether IMT can simultaneously save
money for the government, bring about
more cost-efficient management for the
farmers, and achieve financial and infra-
structural sustainability. Most reports about
impacts are qualitative and hard to validate.
Over a hundred papers were prepared for
the International Conference on Irrigation
Management Transfer, held in Wuhan,
China in September 1994, but only 25 con-
tained data on performance outcomes of
management transfer. Most of those papers
presented only data on performance after
transfer, using at most, two or three perfor-
mance measures. Four papers presented
before-and-after comparisons; one paper
presented a with-and-without comparison
(Turral 1995). It is often difficult to distin-
guish the effects of management transfer
from rehabilitation or changes in inputs or
technology.
This report reviews the evidence emerg-
ing about the impacts of irrigation manage-
ment transfer, with reference to performance
criteria, measures used, and the strength of
evidence. The literature includes the follow-
ing categories of performance measures:
• financial performance
• quality of O&M
• agricultural and economic productivity
• environmental sustainability
Table 1 displays basic information on
the main references in the literature. Most
transfer units are subsections of irrigation
systems that are managed by farmer organi-
zations while the main system continues to
be managed by a government agency. Trans-
fer units range in size from 5-hectare pump
schemes in Indonesia to the 14,000-hectare
Paliganj Distributary Canal in Bihar, India.
In several cases, entire schemes have been
transferred to farmer organizations (usually
federated). These range from 50-hectare
schemes in Indonesia to the 230,000-hectare
Columbia Basin Project in the USA (which
was transferred to three districts serving an
average area of 77,000 hectares).
In less-developed countries, most post-
transfer organizations tend to be water us-
ers’ associations that take over O&M re-
sponsibility directly, at relatively small
scales (i.e., less than 1,000 hectares of ser-
vice area). Although common in Asia and
Africa, they often lack legal powers of
rights-of-way, ability to enforce rules and
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TABLE 1.
Irrigation management transfer studies: Units, levels, and functions transferred.
Size of Functions Owner-
transfer unit New  transferredb ship of
Study and country Transfer unit (ha) managementa O&M Finance assets
Oorthuizen & Kloezen 1995– Entire scheme 150–200 WUA Partial Partial Govt.
Philippines
Wijayaratna & Vermillion 1994– Laterals and entire 500–5,000 WUA Partial Partial Govt.
Philippines scheme
Bagadion 1994–Philippines Distributary canal 2,500 WUA Partial Partial Govt.
Svendsen 1992–Philippines Distributary canal <5,000 WUA Partial Partial Govt.
Johnson & Reiss 1993–Indonesia Tube well 5–200 WUA Partial Full Govt.
Nguyen & Luong 1994–Vietnam Pump scheme n.a. Parastatal Full Full Govt.
Johnson et al. 1995–China Scheme 5,000 Irrigation district Full Full Govt.
IIMI & BAU 1996–Bangladesh Tube well <100 WUA Full Full Private
Rana et al. 1994–Nepal Irrigation system 500–2,000 Agency/WUA Partial Partial Govt.
Olin 1994–Nepal Tube well 120 WUA Full Full Govt.
Mishra & Molden 1996–Nepal Entire scheme 8,700 WUA Partial Partial Govt.
Kloezen 1996–Sri Lanka Distributary canal 80–260 Agency/WUA Partial Partial Govt.
Uphoff 1992–Sri Lanka Field channels 50–150 WUA Full Partial Govt.
Pant 1994–India Tube well 84 Cooperative Full Partial Govt.
Srivastava & Brewer 1994–India Distributary canal 14,000 Intervillage Partial Partial Govt.
committee
Rao 1994–India Minor canal 359–513 WUA Partial Partial Govt.
Shah et al. 1994–India Tube well 50–150 WUA Partial Partial Govt.
Kalro & Naik 1995–India Minor canal lift schemes <400 WUA Full & partial Full & partial Govt.
Azziz 1994–Egypt Field channel 20–60 WUA Full Partial Govt.
Samad & Dingle 1995–Sudan Pump scheme 80–4,000 Private Partial Partial Govt.
company/ WUA
DSI, EDI, & IIMI 1996–Turkey Scheme and subunits 50–34,000 Municipal govts. Full Full Govt.
Maurya 1993; Musa 1994–Nigeria Distributary canal 126–271 Agency/WUA Partial Partial Govt.
Wester, During, & Oorthuizen Lift schemes 20 WUA Full Full Private
1995–Senegal
Yap-Salinas 1994–Dominican Rep. Federated 5,240–9,240 WUA Partial Partial Govt.
Vermillion & Garcés-Restrepo Irrigation district 14,000 WUA/district Partial Full Govt.
1996–Colombia
Garcés-Restrepo & Vermillion Schemes 1,000–25,000 WUA/district Full Full Govt.
1994–Colombia
Johnson 1996–Mexico Blocks 5,000–30,000 WUA Full Full Govt.
Svendsen & Vermillion 1994– Irrigation district 77,000 WUA/district Full Full Govt.
Washington State, USA
Farley 1994–New Zealand Schemes 2,000 Mutual company Full Full Private
aWUA=Water users' associations.
bFull operation and maintenance responsibility is defined as complete control over O&M budgets and implementation, although subject to
governmental regulations. Full financing is net of general agricultural subsidies and rehabilitation.4
fee payments, and authority to make con-
tracts.
At larger scales of transfer, such as in
the USA, Mexico, Japan, and Taiwan, post-
transfer governance entities tend to be
farmer-elected boards of directors while
management entities tend to be cadres of
professional staff. These countries have
stronger legal systems and local institutions
that are more capable of handling manage-
ment at larger scales of complexity than
legal systems and organizations in less-
affluent countries. Irrigation organizations
in industrial countries are independent legal
entities, such as semi-municipalities, mutual
companies, and water districts.
About half of the cases listed in table 1
involve only partial transfer of control over
irrigation O&M, especially for larger sys-
tems. Full transfer of management responsi-
bility occurs more often when the unit of
transfer is an entire small- or medium-scale
scheme (i.e., <2,000 hectares), especially for
lift irrigation. However, full transfer of
management for medium- or large-scale
schemes has occurred in various countries
in the Americas and Europe and in Taiwan.
Government subsidies often continue in
more-developed countries as well as in less-
developed countries (often due to the politi-
cal clout of farmers). In South and South-
east Asia, governments tend to retain partial
control over O&M plans and budgets and
continue to provide partial financing for
O&M. It is common in this region for me-
dium- to large-scale irrigation systems to be
jointly managed, either by dividing the ca-
nal hierarchy into separate spheres of man-
agement or by creating joint agency/farmer
committees to take decisions about O&M
(Merrey 1996).
About half the cases cited involved
transfer of full responsibility for financing
the recurring costs of irrigation. Rarely is
ownership of irrigation infrastructure trans-
ferred to the new management authority.
The only such cases in the cited studies are
the sale of public deep tube wells in Ban-
gladesh to farmer groups and individuals
and the sale of small irrigation systems to
irrigators’ associations in New Zealand. The
transfer program in Chile has also included
transfer of ownership of irrigation facilities
(Gazmuri 1994). For surface irrigation, par-
ticularly in the medium- and large-scale sys-
tems, governments retain responsibility for
future rehabilitation and modernization.
This policy may encourage farmers to defer
maintenance. Also, particularly in Asia and
Africa, neither post-transfer management
entities nor individual farmers have clear or
measurable water rights. This uncertainty
may also inhibit farmers from investing
more fully in the long-term maintenance
and improvement of their irrigation sys-
tems.
Financial Performance
Aspects of financial performance of irriga-
tion that are most related to management
transfer are cost of irrigation to the govern-
ment, cost of irrigation to farmers, levels of
management staff (often the largest compo-
nent of O&M costs), levels of water charges
and collection rates, budget solvency, and
revenue sources. Table 2 summarizes the
key findings of the literature on impacts of
transfer on the financial performance of ir-
rigation.5
TABLE 2.
Reported impacts of IMT on irrigation finance.
Study, country, irrigation type Impacts
Oorthuizen & Kloezen 1995, Philippines, SI Reduced cost to farmers; 75% drop in budget. Fee collection rates rose from 20% to 81%.
Wijayaratna & Vermillion 1994 Revenue from water charges increased from 24% in 1979 to 60% in 1990.
Philippines, SI Reduction in agency field staff. Diversification of revenue sources.
Bagadion 1994 Budget losses converted to surpluses. Fee collection rate rose from 27% to 60%.
Philippines, LI
Svendsen 1992 Decrease in frequency of deficit budgets; increase in revenue from water charges and
Philippines, SI, LI other income. 29% drop in the operating expenditures. Decline in staff from 13% to 75%.
Government subsidy dropped from P25 million in 1976 to zero in 1982.
Johnson & Reiss 1993 Cost of water pumped increased five to seven times.
Indonesia, LI
Johnson et al. 1995 Per hectare cost of water to farmer rose 2.5 times. Growing importance of sideline
China, SI revenue enterprises after reform.
IIMI & BAU 1996 O&M costs remained similar after privatization, though loss of subsidies meant increased
Bangladesh, LI costs to farmers. Diesel deep tube wells not financially viable without subsidy.
Olin 1994 Cost of water decreased 40–50%.
Nepal, LI
Mishra & Molden 1996 Cash and labor value raised from farmers increased to US$6.77/ha, and 77% of farmers
Nepal, SI paid water charges.
Kloezen 1996 Government subsidies for O&M continued. Farmer organizations invested mainly in input
Sri Lanka, SI provisions and marketing, not in O&M. Annual government costs decreased 33%.
Diversification of revenue sources.
Pant 1994 50% reduction in the cost of water. Budget deficits converted to surplus.
India, LI
Shah et al. 1994 50% reduction in cost of water.
India, LI
Kalro & Naik 1995 Increased costs and time required for farmers. Improved rate of recovery for water
India, SI, LI charges. No decline in government expenditures for O&M.
Azziz 1994 Dramatic decline in maintenance costs. Per hectare pumping costs declined from
Egypt, SI US$68–$79 to $45–$50 after rehabilitation and IMT.
DSI, EDI, & IIMI 1996 Increase in average water fee collection rate from 38% to 72% in the first year after IMT.
Turkey, SI, LI
Maurya 1993 Water fee collection rates rose from 50% to 90% after IMT.
Nigeria, SI
Yap-Salinas 1994 Water fees increased 1,500% in 8 years. Fee collection rates increased from 12% to 80%.
Dominican Republic, SI
Vermillion & Garcés-Restrepo 1996 44% average decline in total staff. Farmer emphasis on cost-cutting. No long-term major
Colombia, SI change in cost of irrigation. Cost of water relative to production fell 27%.
Diversificationof revenue sources, from 10% to 20% of revenue other than fees.
Budget deficits converted to surpluses.
Garcés-Restrepo & Vermillion 1994 Declining trend in fee levels. Reduction in staff by 38%. Shift from deficit to surplus
Colombia, SI, LI budgets in all study cases.
Johnson 1996; Gorriz, 45–180% increase in water charges. Increase in fee collection rates from 15%, originally,
Subramanian, & Simas 1995 to 80% to 100%. Shortfall in financing declined nationally from US$66 million to
Mexico, SI $41 million annually. Local self-reliance increased from 43% to 78%.
Svendsen & Vermillion 1994 Decrease in government staff by 86%. Farmer emphasis on cost-cutting. Volumetric
USA, SI charges reduced by 16%. Diversification of revenue sources. Water charge was 80% of
revenue before and 67% after IMT. Farmers raised capital replacement fund.
Farley 1994 Farmer emphasis on cost-cutting. Average operational costs declined 66%. After IMT,
New Zealand, SI water charges were a quarter to a half of the pre-IMT level.
Notes: SI = surface irrigation. LI = lift irrigation.6
Cost to government
One of the main reasons governments pro-
mote transfer programs is to save money by
reducing the cost burden of irrigation man-
agement (Johnson 1995). Therefore it is cu-
rious that there is little information on im-
pacts on the government. Only four of the
cited studies mentioned effects of transfer
on costs of irrigation to the government.
Three reported a decline in government
expenditures, and one reported no change.
Potentially, transfer could reduce govern-
ment expenditures for O&M and allow real-
location of central revenues to construction
or other costs within the irrigation or agri-
culture sector. Or transfer could lead to a re-
duction in the total budget for the sector.
Much depends on size of budgets, financial
policy, and political will.
In the Philippines, the move to make
the National Irrigation Administration
(NIA) financially autonomous and to turn
over irrigation system management by 1990
gave the government annual savings of
US$12/ha from cash and in-kind contribu-
tions in systems where transfer was par-
tially or fully implemented (Bagadion and
Korten 1991). Revenues from irrigation fees
collected by water users’ associations, which
partially or fully took over irrigation man-
agement, constituted 24 percent of NIA’s
total revenue in 1979 and 60 percent by
1990 (Wijayaratna and Vermillion 1994). In
the early stages of the transfer program in
the Philippines, the government’s expendi-
tures for irrigation O&M fell from P25 mil-
lion in 1976 to zero by 1982. Subsequently,
however, limited subsidies were reintro-
duced (Svendsen 1992).
Kloezen (1996) shows that the rise of
the participatory management policy in Sri
Lanka lowered government irrigation O&M
expenditures from approximately US$14.80/
ha in 1985 to $6.50/ha in 1994. Pant (1994)
indicates that in Uttar Pradesh, India, the
transfer of a typical public tube well to
farmer management reduced government
subsidies to the tube well system from
US$876 before IMT to $656 afterward, or by
25 percent. In the West Gandak scheme in
Nepal, government expenditures for main-
tenance declined from US$6.65/ha to $4.06/
ha after transfer (Mishra and Molden 1996).
The small-scale irrigation turnover pro-
gram in Indonesia includes about 70 percent
of all public irrigation systems and 21 per-
cent of the total irrigation design area. By
the time the program has been fully imple-
mented, the government will annually save
an estimated US$13.5 million in O&M costs
(Vermillion and Johnson 1990). Vermillion
(1989) calculated the budgetary effect of the
planned policy of reallocating funds from
small-scale systems to underfunded me-
dium- and large-scale systems. In the
Sumedang Section of the West Java Provin-
cial Irrigation Service, which has numerous
small-scale systems and only a few me-
dium- or large-scale ones (i.e., over 500
hectares in service area), turnover would
permit transfer of all O&M funds for small-
scale to medium- or large-scale systems,
which would allow an increase in O&M ex-
penditures on the larger systems from a pre-
turnover level of about US$10/ha to a post-
turnover goal of $15/ha, to prevent deterio-
ration of larger systems.
As a result of Mexico’s large-scale man-
agement transfer program, annual govern-
ment subsidies for irrigation O&M fell from
US$40 million in 1989 to zero by 1993, at
which time approximately 2.4 million hect-
ares of service area had been transferred to
farmer management (Johnson 1996).
Gazmuri (1994) asserts that at a macro level
in Chile, irrigation management transfer
had a positive effect on redistribution of
wealth from the wealthier (those who had
water) to the poorer. After transfer, public7
funds previously spent on irrigation were
diverted to poverty-alleviation programs.
However, no data are available.
There is little evidence on the effect of
management transfer policies on overall
government spending in the water or agri-
culture sectors of developing countries.
Most studies dealing with the issue only
document government spending for O&M,
especially at the scheme level. No attempts
have been made to determine whether sav-
ings from decreased government spending
for irrigation O&M are being diverted to
new construction, rehabilitation, or other
uses within the sector, or to other sectors, or
used to permit an overall shrinking of gov-
ernment expenditures. There is a need for
studies to examine sector-level impacts of
transfer policies and test the proposition
that transfer actually reduces the cost of ir-
rigation to the government, particularly in
the long term.
Cost to farmers
The literature suggests that where signifi-
cant subsidies that existed before transfer
are dropped, the cost of irrigation to farm-
ers may rise substantially. Where there is
little or no change in subsidies, transfer may
lead to a decrease in irrigation costs to
farmers. High-cost systems, such as pump
irrigation, are especially likely to signifi-
cantly increase the cost of water to farmers.
Lift irrigation systems seem to be the most
financially vulnerable after transfer. Two
studies reported that tube wells were not fi-
nancially viable after transfer without gov-
ernment subsidy (Johnson and Reiss 1993;
IIMI and BAU 1996).
In Senegal, project reports indicate that
after transfer of lift schemes supervision of
pumps by farmer-hired staff improved,
which reduced overpumping. Due to a loss
of government subsidies, however, water
charges rose 200 to 400 percent, despite a 50
percent decrease in the cost of electricity for
pumping (Meinzen-Dick et al. 1997). More
broadly, privatization of irrigated agricul-
ture in the Senegal River valley (irrigated by
river lift pump schemes) led to a 78 percent
increase in the cost of rice production for
farmers between 1980 and 1993 (in constant
1980 prices), due primarily to discontinu-
ance of subsidies for credit, input provision,
and irrigation. The price of rice (in 1980 dol-
lars) rose by 65 percent during the period,
from approximately US$0.11/kg in 1980 to
$0.19/kg in 1993 (Wester, During, and
Oorthuizen 1995; Meinzen-Dick et al. 1997).
After turnover of pump schemes to
farmer groups in Indonesia, water charges
to farmers increased fivefold to sevenfold,
because government subsidies were low-
ered (Johnson and Reiss 1993).
In India, where the cost of electricity for
pump irrigation is heavily subsidized, Pant
(1994) notes that a consequence of turnover
of a public tube well to farmer management
in Uttar Pradesh was more efficient pump
use, which brought about a reduction in
water costs from US$2.70/ha to $1.20/ha in
kharif (summer season) and from $6.20 to
$3.20/ha for rabi (winter season). The num-
ber of irrigations increased from two to
three. However, since data were only avail-
able for 2 years, it was impossible to con-
firm a trend In Gujarat, in a post-transfer
comparison of tube well system perfor-
mance for 30 sample wells, Shah et al.
(1994) report that, after turnover of public
tube wells, irrigated area increased 30 to 400
percent in sample systems, and the price of
water fell by 40 to 50 percent.
In a before-and-after comparison in a
180-hectare block of a medium-size system
in Southern Luzon, the Philippines,
Oorthuizen and Kloezen (1995) found that
the average total annual expenditures for8
O&M were US$31,196 during the 4-year pe-
riod before transfer and $7,696 (in 1982 dol-
lars) during the 4 years following transfer—
a 75 percent reduction. Studies in the USA
(Svendsen and Vermillion 1994), Colombia
(Vermillion and Garcés-Restrepo 1994), and
the Philippines (Lauraya and Sala 1994) re-
port an engineers’ concern that the ten-
dency for farmers to push cost-cutting to
the extreme after IMT may accelerate sys-
tem deterioration.
Reforms leading to local financial and
managerial self-reliance in the Bayi and
Nanyao irrigation districts in Hebei, China,
resulted in increases in annual surface water
costs (in 1991 dollars) in Bayi from US$13/
ha in 1984 to $36/ha in 1992 and in Nanyao
from $24/ha in 1984 to $60/ha in 1992
(Johnson, Svendsen, and Zhang 1994).
From a sample study of six irrigation
districts in Mexico, Gorriz, Subramanian,
and Simas (1995) report an immediate and
consistent nominal increase in water fees
after transfer of between 45 percent and 180
percent (ranging from US$2.25 to $7.79/
1,000 m
3 ) in 1994. Fees also increased mod-
estly in real terms relative to the cost of pro-
duction (Johnson 1996).
Transfer of the Coello and Saldaña sys-
tems in Colombia was accompanied by a
significant reduction in government subsi-
dies. The area-based water fee (in constant
1988 dollars) rose from US$1.50/ha in 1967
to $8.68/ha at transfer in 1976 and then de-
clined to $5.54/ha in 1993. Conversely, the
volumetric water fee was declining before
IMT (from $22/100 m
3 in 1967 to $13/100
m
3 at transfer in 1976), but reversed to a
modest rising trend afterward, reaching
$16/100 m
3 in 1993. The overall cost of wa-
ter rose somewhat after transfer as a result
of a policy to raise the proportion of the
charges that are based on the volume of
use. From a broader perspective, the total
cost of water relative to the cost of rice pro-
duction, 4.4 percent in the 1950s, was low
anyway, and it fell still further after trans-
fer—to 3.3 percent in Coello in 1993 and to
3.1 percent in Saldaña (Vermillion and
Garcés-Restrepo 1996).
Comparative post-transfer evidence
about reduced costs of irrigation as a result
of transfer also comes from New Zealand
where the government privatized 49 irriga-
tion schemes in the early 1990s through the
outright sale of the districts. Of these, 47
were sold to farmer groups. Farley (1994)
reports that water charges on privatized
schemes are one-half to one-quarter the
costs on government “pre-privatized”
schemes, even though government schemes
still retained subsidies for O&M costs while
privatized schemes paid the full cost of op-
erations. This is attributed to privatized
schemes cutting operational costs by 66 per-
cent, on average, reducing overhead costs,
and designing simpler repair and mainte-
nance work. In the Hawea system, annual
water charges were US$24/ha before
privatization and $10/ha afterward. The
Greenstreet system was privatized in 1990,
and by 1994 it had an annual water fee of
$2.10/ha and cash reserves of $3.30/ha,
compared with average water fees exceed-
ing $7.00/ha and average debt loads of
$30/ha for government schemes in the
same region. The Bannockburn system,
privatized in 1990, had an annual water
charge of $10.80/ha with no debts, while
government schemes in the same region
had water charges ranging from US$25 to
US$47/ha with large debts.
In the USA, farmers in the Columbia
Basin Project were already paying close to
the full cost of O&M before the transfer (ex-
cept for subsidized electricity for pumping
water out of the Columbia Basin, which
continued after transfer). In this case, IMT
also prompted a reversal in trends in water
charges, beginning with a rising trend fol-9
lowed by a downward trend after transfer.
Water charges rose from US$159/ha in 1961
to an annual average of $198/ha in 1969–73
and then gradually fell (in real terms) to
$122/ha by 1989, constituting an average
decline in assessment rates of 22 percent
and a decline of 16 percent in volumetric
charges (from $83/ha-m to $70/ha-m) be-
tween the pre- and post-transfer periods
(Svendsen and Vermillion 1994).
The studies were divided in reporting
changes in cost of irrigation to farmers.
Eight studies reported reduced costs, seven
reported increased costs, with changes oc-
curring in both directions in surface and lift
irrigation schemes. Eight studies noted a
decline in the overall cost of irrigation; only
one reported an increase. Costs to farmers
are most likely to increase in lift irrigation
schemes or in other schemes where govern-
ment subsidies are removed (such as in In-
donesia, Bangladesh, and Senegal). How-
ever, increased costs of irrigation to farmers
may be offset by an even more rapidly ris-
ing value of production (as was reported in
studies on IMT in Colombia and the USA).
There is a tendency for studies to rely
either on data about costs of irrigation to
the government or costs of irrigation to
farmers, without combining the two to de-
rive the total cost of irrigation. Both are
needed to get a complete picture on finan-
cial impacts of management transfer.
Management staff
In countries where transfer is intended to
reduce government expenditure, reports
generally indicate that irrigation agency
staff size diminished following transfer, ei-
ther at system or administrative levels. This
decline is often gradual however, as govern-
ments wait for staff to retire. In the Philip-
pines, the number of employees of the NIA
at regional and system levels throughout
the country was reduced, and the service
area per staff member improved from 38.5
ha/staff in 1976 to 100 ha/staff by 1985 as a
result of management transfer. Oorthuizen
and Kloezen (1995) report that turnover of a
system in Southern Luzon led to a decrease
in agency staff from 24 in 1982 to only 6 in
1987, or a change in average service area
per staff member from 75 ha/staff in 1982
to 300 ha/staff in 1987. Consequently an-
nual operating expenses dropped 60%.
Similar declines in government staff and
operating expenses were reported by
Svendsen (1992) in a sample of transferred
systems. The decline in NIA staff was part
of a policy under which positions were not
filled after staff retired. The requirement
that NIA become self-financing motivated
the agency to reduce costs. It is not clear
from these reports how many new manage-
ment staff members, sponsored by the
farmer organizations, may have been hired
to replace former agency staff members.
In the Columbia Basin Project in the
USA, there were 612 Bureau of Reclamation
staff members in 1969, the year of transfer.
By 1985 only 83 remained. Staff declines
were even steeper in the Irrigation and
Land Management Division where staff
numbers dropped from 297 in 1969 to only
22 in 1985 (Svendsen and Vermillion 1994).
Staff members were either rehired by the
districts, transferred to other systems, or re-
tired. Again, data are not available on how
the pre-transfer numbers of agency staff
members compared with the post-transfer
numbers of non-agency staff members.
Studies on transfer in Mexico and Co-
lombia have reported data on total staff
(agency or farmer-sponsored) before and af-
ter transfer. In Mexico, Johnson (1996) re-
ported total irrigation system staff fell
slightly after transfer but government staff
dropped from 7,742 before transfer to 4,45010
by 1993. In Colombia, the 10 irrigation sys-
tems transferred to farmer management be-
tween 1990 and 1994 had an average de-
cline of 44 percent staff, which produced an
average increase in area served per district-
level staff of 211 percent. Coello and Sal-
daña, which were transferred in 1976, to-
gether had 300 district staff members in
1975 and 189 staff members in 1993. In 1975,
an average of 62 ha/staff were served,
whereas in 1993, 147 ha/staff were served
(Garcés-Restrepo and Vermillion 1994).
Five of the cited studies reported reduc-
tions in the number of staff after transfer
(three of which apparently referred only to
numbers of agency staff). None reported in-
creases. This is because, in most cases,
transfer programs are part of a government
policy to reduce spending in the irrigation
subsector. However, some studies that rely
only on government data about staffing
may overlook the hiring of staff by farmer
organizations. The failure to include data on
both agency and farmer organization staff
can give an exaggerated impression of de-
clines in the total irrigation management
staff.
Generally, farmer-sponsored organiza-
tions are unwilling to hire or retain “excess”
staff members, which governments in devel-
oping countries often do. When the govern-
ment policy is to reduce or eliminate irriga-
tion management staff when carrying out
transfer programs, the government usually
relocates staff members into systems that
are not being transferred (as in Indonesia
and Sri Lanka), does not fill posts when
staff members retire (as in the Philippines),
encourages farmer associations to hire
former agency staff members after transfer
(as in Colombia), transfers staff members
into non-O&M activities, such as construc-
tion of new systems (as in Turkey), or re-
vises the agency’s overall mandate, such as
in the USA where the Bureau of Reclama-
tion shifted into environmental regulation
after the end of the construction era.
Fee collection rates
Evidence on impacts of transfer on fee col-
lection rates is generally based on post-
transfer data or simple before-and-after
comparisons. I am not aware of any time-
series trend analyses or with-and-without
comparative samples. In the Philippines,
Bagadion (1994) reports the average annual
irrigation fee collection rates in the
Libmanan-Cabusao pump irrigation system
to have been 27 percent for 1982–88 and 60
percent for the post-transfer period 1990–92.
In another study in a NIA system in south-
ern Luzon, fee collection increased from 20
percent before transfer to 81 percent in 1989,
after transfer (Oorthuizen and Kloezen
1995). Mishra and Molden (1996) also report
a substantial rise in collection rates and
overall labor and cash raised by farmers af-
ter transfer in Nepal.
In the On-Farm Water Management
Project in the Dominican Republic, despite a
1,500 percent increase in water fees between
1985 and 1993 as a result of management
transfer, fee collection rates rose from 12
percent before IMT to 80 percent afterward,
reportedly due to significant improvements
in the reliability of water delivery (Yap-Sali-
nas 1994; Hanrahan 1990). In Mexico, water
fee collection rates rose from only 15 per-
cent before transfer to 80 to 100 percent af-
terward. Collection rates are generally 60 to
70 percent during the first transitional year
and above 80 percent by the second year
(Gorriz, Subramanian, and Simas 1995, 32).
This high rate results largely from the dis-
tricts’ requirement that farmers pay fees be-
fore water is delivered (Johnson 1996).
In China, total water fee collection
throughout the country increased from11
US$51 million in 1984, when reforms were
just starting, to $415 million in 1992 (in 1994
dollars), partly because collection rates in-
creased from 30 percent in 1984 to 70 per-
cent in 1991. In conjunction with organizing
farmers and turning over management re-
sponsibility in the Kano River Irrigation
Project in northern Nigeria, water fee collec-
tion rates rose from only 50 percent before
IMT in 1989 to more than 90 percent in 1990
after farmers became involved for the first
time in collecting the fee. Following the ap-
proach of NIA in the Philippines, farmer
organizations in the Kano project are
granted rebates for 10 to 15 percent of fees
collected if the total collection rate exceeds
80 percent (Maurya 1993). Aside from the
common rise in fee collection rates, what
these cases of transfer have in common is
that farmer organizations became involved
in collecting the fees, they received incen-
tives for collecting over a certain rate, and
they gained more voice in determining how
the fees were to be spent.
In summary, 10 studies reported signifi-
cant increases in water fee collection rates,
none reported decreases. Increases were
generally substantial, from the 10 to 30 per-
cent range to the 80 to 100 percent range.
Increases in collection rates were reported to
have been facilitated because farmers were
more satisfied with the irrigation service
and because the post-transfer farmer organi-
zation was better able to collect fees from
farmers (often with the intervention of vil-
lage authorities).
Budget solvency
Financial solvency after transfer depends on
the level of subsidy that is removed as well
as on the capacity of the post-transfer man-
aging organization to cut costs and raise
additional revenue. Six of the studies re-
ported a shift from deficit to surplus budget
balances for irrigation systems after man-
agement transfer; none reported a trend to-
ward more deficits. This is partly because
post-transfer management entities lack suf-
ficient reserve funds to operate at a deficit
in any year.
In their study in southern Luzon, the
Philippines, Oorthuizen and Kloezen (1995)
report that the system’s annual budget defi-
cit declined from an average of US$19,178
during 1982–85 to $554 during 1986–89, the
first 4 years after transfer. This improvement
largely occurred because farmers cut annual
expenditures by 25 percent and increased
fee collection from 20 percent to over 80
percent. Pant (1994) reported annual losses
of US$876 before transfer of a public tube
well in Uttar Pradesh, India, that changed
to consistent surpluses after transfer. Baga-
dion (1994) reported that the Libmanan-
Cabusao pump irrigation system in the
Philippines was able to convert an annual
average loss of US$42,218 for 1981–89 into
an annual average surplus of $42,880 after
transfer, during 1990–92.
In the transfer of 3.3 million hectares
served by large irrigation systems in
Mexico, the annual national shortfall in
meeting irrigation district costs fell from
US$66 million in 1989 to $41 million in
1993, when transfer was 80 percent com-
pleted. The share of total irrigation system
O&M costs, which are financed by farmers
or other local sources (as opposed to gov-
ernment funds), rose from 43 percent in
1989 to 78 percent in 1993. These figures,
however, should be compared with data on
the total cost of irrigation management,
both to the government and to the farmers.
The absence of district reserve funds, a
fixed base fee, and government subsidies
means that the districts will be financially
vulnerable in the event of drought (when
there is no water to sell) or when major re-12
pairs or rehabilitation are needed (Johnson
1996).
Prior to transfer in 1976, Coello and
Saldaña districts, Colombia, had budget
deficits in most years. During the 16 years
after transfer, Coello had a balanced or
surplus budget, whereas Saldaña (which had
higher costs because of a substantial amount
of necessary dredging and desilting) had
deficits during 8 of the years (Vermillion and
Garcés-Restrepo 1996). Garcés-Restrepo and
Vermillion (1994) report that all irrigation
districts transferred to farmer organizations in
Colombia between 1990 and 1994 had budget
deficits for 2 to 4 years before transfer and
had surpluses during the first 2 to 4 years
measured afterward. Decreases in expen-
ditures (mainly due to staff layoffs) and
increases in revenue (primarily from increases
in water charges) accounted for the improved
financial conditions.
In summary, the most typical financial
impacts of management transfer are lower
overall costs of irrigation (including de-
creased government spending for irrigation
O&M), an increase in the cost of irrigation to
farmers (especially in lift schemes), and
higher rates of collection of charges from
farmers. Not surprisingly, the financial vi-
ability of post-transfer organizations is more
apparent in areas where agricultural and
economic productivity of irrigated agricul-
ture is high (such as in the USA, Mexico,
Chile, and Colombia). The most problematic
financial situations appear to be where the
cost of irrigation to farmers is already rela-
tively high (such as in lift schemes in India,
Bangladesh, and Indonesia) and where ei-
ther the government is dropping a subsidy
or where the profitability of agriculture is
not high. The literature provides almost no
data with a time frame long enough to
assess the financial sustainability of manage-
ment after transfer. This is a major issue,
particularly since few post-transfer manage-
ment organizations raise a capital replace-
ment fund, and policies about who will be
responsible for future rehabilitation and
modernization are normally quite unclear.
Diversity of revenue sources
Five of the cited studies reported a ten-
dency to diversify revenue sources after
management transfer. Usually this occurs
where the post-transfer organization has full
responsibility for financing the costs of
irrigation and where farmers exert pressure
to keep water fees as low as possible (as in
Colombia, China, and the USA). In these
cases, diversified revenue collection is a
strategy to cross-subsidize irrigation costs
after government subsidies have been dis-
continued. Revenue diversification also
occurs where post-transfer organizations
expand their mandate beyond O&M and
into the economic productivity of irrigated
agriculture, as was reported in the
Philippines (Wijayaratna 1993) and Sri
Lanka.
In the Coello system in Colombia, irri-
gation district revenue from sources other
than water charges increased from 10 per-
cent of revenue in 1983 to 20 percent by
1992 (Vermillion and Garcés-Restrepo 1994).
In the 5,000-hectare Kaudulla scheme in Sri
Lanka, farmer organizations took over man-
agement of distributary canals in 1992 and
quickly federated to the main system level,
diversifying revenue sources including col-
lection of membership, seasonal, and share-
holder fees; provision of fertilizers and
agro-chemicals; rice marketing; tractor
rental; and interest from small loans. Within
2 years the organization had raised
US$8,335 from profits on input sales total-
ing $200,000, with a net profit rate of 4 per-
cent.
1 Through group rice marketing, the
organization also obtained a selling price of
1However, the 4 percent
net profit rate is over-
shadowed by an agricul-
tural credit interest rate
of 9 percent and an an-
nual rate of inflation of
approximately 11 per-
cent.13
approximately $0.01/kg above the market
rate (Kloezen 1996).
The reforms in China during the 1980s
promoted the formation of sideline enter-
prises to cross-subsidize local government
budgets after the demise of line agency
funding from central government sources
(Gitomer 1994). Today, sideline enterprises
are a common source of financing for irriga-
tion districts. For example, the Bayi district
in Hebei province developed nine sideline
enterprises between 1984 and 1992 after it
became financially autonomous. The enter-
prises produced approximately US$60,000
in profits during this period, of which 65
percent was allocated to the district for wa-
ter management costs, and the rest went to
salaries and bonuses of enterprise workers,
many of whom were family members of ir-
rigation management staff employed by the
district to work in the “diversified manage-
ment division.” By 1994, 30 percent of the
Bayi district revenue was from its sideline
enterprises (Vermillion et al. 1994).
Following management transfer, irriga-
tion districts in the Columbia Basin Project,
USA, have diversified their revenue sources
in an effort by farmer-elected board mem-
bers to keep water charges as low as pos-
sible. Before transfer in 1976, the water
charge was 80 percent of revenue. It de-
clined to 67 percent of revenue by 1989 as
the districts developed seven mini-hydro-
power stations and engaged in water selling
contracts and other income-generating
activities.
Quality of Operations and Maintenance
Much of the literature supporting manage-
ment transfer asserts that it improves the
quality of O&M of irrigation systems. The
most common kind of evidence employed
is qualitative statements by project officers,
farmers, researchers, and rapid appraisal
visitors, often based on chance encounters
or group interviews with farmers. Project
studies in the Philippines, Sri Lanka, Nepal,
and India have reported farmer satisfaction
with improved water delivery service and
equity after IMT (Meinzen-Dick, Manzardo,
and Reidinger 1995; Uphoff 1992).
Table 3 summarizes key findings of lit-
erature on the results of IMT on the perfor-
mance of irrigation O&M. Seven studies
reported that equity of water distribution
improved after transfer; one study on the
Philippines reported that it became worse
(Oorthuizen and Kloezen 1995). Seven stud-
ies reported an increase in service area after
transfer. In Turkey, the average service area
expanded 20 to 40 percent only 1 year after
transfer (DSI, EDI, and IIMI 1996). Three
studies reported lower water consumption
per hectare (two of the studies were on lift
schemes, in Vietnam and Nepal). Four stud-
ies reported improvements in water ad-
equacy after transfer. Two reported a wors-
ening situation in water distribution after
transfer in lift schemes in Sudan and Ban-
gladesh, due to the failure of the farmer’s
organizations to develop and function prop-
erly (Samad and Dingle 1995; IIMI and
BAU 1996).
Reports of experiences in Mexico
(Gorriz, Subramanian, and Simas 1995), Co-
lombia (Vermillion and Garcés-Restrepo
1994), and the USA (Svendsen and Vermil-
lion 1994) indicate farmer perceptions that
O&M staff have become more responsive to
farmers after turnover. Maintenance is re-
ported to be more responsive to farmers’
priorities after turnover in Chile (Meinzen-14
TABLE 3.
Reported impacts of irrigation management transfer on O&M.
Study, country, type of irrigation Operations Maintenance
Oorthuizen & Kloezen 1995 Water distribution became less equitable. Worsened.
Philippines, SI
Wijayaratna & Vermillion 1994 Improved water distribution equity; expansion of n.a.
Philippines, SI dry-season irrigated area.
Bagadion 1994, Philippines, LI No increasing trend in service area. n.a.
Svendsen 1992 Equity of water distribution improved and 7%
Philippines, SI, LI expansion of benefited area in the dry season. n.a.
Johnson & Reiss 1993 n.a. Deterioration of pump sets
Indonesia, LI accelerated.
Nguyen & Luong 1994 Water consumption per hectare dropped 36%. n.a.
Vietnam, LI Area irrigated increased 71%.
Johnson et al. 1995, China, SI Reduction in water duty from 11,000 m3 to 4,500 m3. n.a.
IIMI & BAU 1996 Declining numbers of farmers reporting adequate Higher breakdown rates in smaller
Bangladesh, LI and timely water delivery. pumps; spare parts and repair easier.
Olin 1994, Nepal, LI Drop in water consumption by 50%. n.a.
Rana et al. 1994, Nepal, SI Irrigation discharge increased fourfold. n.a.
Mishra & Molden 1996 Inflow increased from 2.2 m3/s to 7.9 m3/s (26%–93% n.a.
Nepal, SI of design capacity)
Kloezen 1996, Sri Lanka, SI Quality of water distribution did not change. n.a.
Uphoff 1992 Improved equity of water distribution. Maintenance activity and investment
Sri Lanka, SI increased.
Pant 1994, India, LI Reduced average irrigation time. Maintenance work increased.
Srivastava & Brewer 1994 Improved equity; 27% more water to tail end; 20% More maintenance activity.
India, SI increase in irrigated area in the dry season.
Rao 1994, India, SI Improved equity of water distribution. n.a.
Kalro & Naik 1995 Adequacy and reliability of water distribution n.a.
India, SI, LI improved, as reported qualitatively.
Azziz 1994, Egypt, SI Reduced irrigation time; better water adequacy. n.a.
Samad & Dingle 1995 Timeliness and water adequacy worse in schemes n.a.
Sudan, LI turned over.
DSI, EDI, & IIMI 1996, Turkey, SI, LI In first year, area served increased 20–40%. n.a.
Wester, During, & Oorthuizen 1995 Expansion of areas irrigated. Deterioration of pump sets accelerated.
Senegal, LI
Maurya 1993; Musa 1994 Improved equity; 12% more water reached middle Increased maintenance activity.
Nigeria, SI and tail reaches.
Yap-Salinas 1994 Delivery efficiency improved 25–30%. n.a.
Dominican Republic, SI
Vermillion & Garcés-Restrepo More responsive operations. Water adequacy Good maintenance; 92–98% of farmers
1996, Colombia, SI satisfactory. 40–45% of farmers say operations report quality of maintenance has not
improved. Temporary inefficiencies after IMT. changed.
Expansion of area irrigated.
Johnson 1996, Mexico, SI No change in water delivered per hectare or in area irrigated. n.a.
Svendsen & Vermillion 1994 More responsive operations. Efficiency did not
USA, SI change. Equity improved slightly. Good but slight declining trend detected.
Notes: SI = surface irrigation.  LI = lift irrigation.  n.a.= not available.15
Dick et al. 1997). However, assessments of
farmer perceptions through participatory
appraisal and group interview methods
may not be reliable for making generaliza-
tions or assessing “external validity;” their
value is more in eliciting farmer perfor-
mance criteria and examining local dynam-
ics (Gosselink and Strosser 1996; Pretty
1995).
Post-transfer reporting of change is
common. Oorthuizen and Kloezen (1995)
report on a case of IMT in Southern Luzon,
the Philippines, where financial autonomy
prompted farmers to take cost-cutting mea-
sures that negatively affected water distri-
bution and maintenance, as reported by
farmers and agency officials. Svendsen and
Vermillion (1994) for the USA and Vermil-
lion and Garcés-Restrepo (1996) for Colom-
bia report a similar tendency of farmer-
elected boards of directors to cut costs to
the point of compromising O&M perfor-
mance.
Operations
In a study of two systems turned over to
farmer management in central Colombia in
1976, Vermillion and Garcés-Restrepo (1996)
obtained survey data from 93 farmers
sampled from the upper and lower reaches
of the Coello and Saldaña irrigation sys-
tems. In the Coello system, where relative
water supply was reported to be approxi-
mately 1.4 (Levine 1982) and a variety of
crops is planted, 45 percent of farmers inter-
viewed said water delivery was “always
enough” while 32 percent said it was
“enough most of the time.” Forty percent
judged that management in general had
“improved” after IMT; 53 percent said it
had “not changed much.” In Saldaña
(where relative water supply is in the order
of 1.8 and only rice is planted), 59 percent
said water delivery was “always enough”
and 31 percent said it was “enough most of
the time.” Forty-five percent stated manage-
ment had “improved,” 35 percent said it
had “not changed much,” but 25 percent
said it had “worsened.” Farmers were
asked to compare the pre-transfer and post-
transfer situations and their perceptions ob-
tained 19 years after transfer constitute a
rather weak and possibly unbalanced be-
fore-and-after comparison
Contrary to the common notion that
farmers generally want complete control,
only 29 percent of farmers in the Coello and
Saldaña districts wanted INAT (National
Institute of Land Development), the irriga-
tion agency, to withdraw completely; 48
percent wanted the agency to remain par-
tially involved in management (mainly to
protect against abuses by powerful farmers
and to help settle disputes); and 21 percent
preferred the agency to resume manage-
ment.
Before-and-after time-line data on an-
nual irrigation supply in Coello show a
long-term declining trend from 1,300 mm/
ha in 1975 (the year before transfer) to 400
mm/ha in 1991. The smaller irrigation sup-
ply per hectare is due to expanded area and
declining river flows at the source. Under
these circumstances, it is notable that man-
agement was able to keep farmers relatively
satisfied with water adequacy after the
transfer. Vermillion and Garcés-Restrepo
(1996) report current water use efficiencies
to be 73 percent in Coello and 57 percent in
Saldaña.
In a pilot IMT project in the Kano River
Irrigation Project in Nigeria, newly orga-
nized farmers changed water distribution
schedules to discontinue nighttime irriga-
tion and improve head/tail equity. This in-
creased the volume of water reaching
middle and tail reaches of distributary ca-
nals by 12 percent within the season the16
changes were introduced (Musa 1994). On
the basis of post-transfer farmer interviews
and observations of water distribution,
Kloezen (1996) reports that turnover of dis-
tributary canals to farmer organizations in
Sri Lanka did not change water distribution
practices at the field-channel level, because
agency staff were still involved in manage-
ment, canals had been recently rehabilitated
and were in good condition, water was
abundant, and the attention of the farmer
organizations was more on agricultural pro-
duction than on irrigation.
Comparisons of performance between
systems with-IMT versus without-IMT are
rare in the literature. Most present either
post-transfer or before-and-after data.
Nguyen and Luong (1994) conducted a
post-transfer study on the effects of man-
agement transfer of a medium-size pump
scheme along the Red River in Vietnam.
They report that irrigation efficiency (i.e.,
ratio of water delivered to diverted) in-
creased from 50 percent to 81 percent and
water consumption decreased from 8,000
m
3/ha to 5,120 m
3/ha (a 36% drop) over a
4-year period after IMT. In another post-
transfer report, irrigation efficiency in the
Azua system in the Dominican Republic in-
creased 25 to 30 percent after management
transfer under the On-Farm Water Manage-
ment Project (NESPAK 1994).
Before-and-after comparisons are more
reliable than post-transfer data because they
help rule out the possibility of trends hav-
ing begun before IMT and continuing into
the post-transfer period. These tend to be
simple, short-term comparisons. They lack a
time line long enough to confirm the exist-
ence of an interrupted pattern at the time of
transfer. In a simple before-and-after com-
parison, Pant (1994) reports that the turn-
over of a public tube well in Uttar Pradesh,
India, increased water and electricity use
efficiencies by reducing the average dura-
tion of pumping time per irrigation in the
kharif season from 42.4 and 39.3 hr/ha in
the 2 years before turnover to 13.4 and 22.8
hr/ha in the first 2 years after turnover
(1993–94). In Egypt, Azziz (1994) reports a
dramatic and consistent reduction in aver-
age irrigation time after management trans-
fer in a sample of mesqas (small storage/
shallow-lift pump turnouts) from an aver-
age of 15.0 to 17.5 hr/ha before IMT to 5.0
to 7.5 hr/ha after IMT. However, no com-
parison with non-mesqa or nontransferred
turnout groups is given, so it is not clear
whether similar improvements occurred in
other areas over time as well.
Regarding impacts on equity, Rao (1994)
compares water delivery in three minor
commands in the Sreeramsagar project in
Andhra Pradesh, India, which irrigated
maize, turmeric, and groundnut. One year
after management transfer, he recorded an
improvement in equity among the three
blocks. The blocks received 2,186 m
3/ha,
4,387 m
3/ha, and 12,065 m
3/ha before trans-
fer as compared with 7,416 m
3/ha, 7,307
m
3/ha, and 10,329 m
3/ha, respectively, after
transfer. However, this was in a system
where total irrigation supply exceeded gross
demand by more than 200 percent.
Transfer of management for the 12,000-
hectare Paliganj Distributary Canal in the
Sone Command in Bihar, India, to a feder-
ated farmer organization in 1989 resulted in
a new rotational arrangement in the dry
season, policing of breaches, and the new
use of farmer canal-repair parties. The im-
pact on equity of water distribution was re-
ported in a simple, short-term, before-and-
after comparison. In 1988, 17 percent of
water entering the distributary reached gate
10, which was two-thirds of the distance to
the tail end of the canal. By 1990, after farm-
ers had taken over O&M of the canal, 21
percent of water entering the canal reached
gate 10 and for the first time on record, wa-17
ter reached the tail end of the canal (Vermil-
lion 1992). Before transfer, 31 percent of the
canal command area located in the tail end
received an average of 10 to 12 percent of
the total canal water. During 3 years after
the transfer, 18 percent of the available canal
water reached the tail area (Srivastava and
Brewer 1994).
Long-term time series data on irrigation
efficiencies before and after management
devolution, or IMT, are available from case
studies in the medium-scale Nanyao and
Bayi irrigation districts in the north China
plain (Johnson et al. 1995). In Nanyao dis-
trict, the rise in annual cost of irrigation
water from US$4.68/ha in 1972 to $31.84/ha
in 1993 (in 1991 dollars) helped bring about
a decline in water duty from 11,000 m
3/ha
in 1973 to only 4,500 m
3/ha in 1993. This
trend was part of a larger policy to reduce
water consumption per hectare and cannot
be attributed only to the reforms, which oc-
curred in the mid-1980s. But it is likely that
the more active involvement of farmers and
village governments in irrigation manage-
ment helped facilitate the decline in water
consumption per hectare.
The annual discharge into the Nanyao
system increased from 28 million cubic
meters in 1972 to about 60 million cubic
meters in 1982 (when the commune system
collapsed) and then steadily declined to 20
million cubic meters in 1993. The same peak
and decline trend occurred in the Bayi sys-
tem, where total annual discharge (from
surface water and groundwater) rose from 6
million cubic meters in 1972 to 34 million
cubic meters in 1980, then fell to 17 million
cubic meters in 1993. The average annual
number of surface irrigations in Nanyao
decreased from three in 1973 to two in 1992
and in Bayi from six in 1973 to four in
1992—after peaking in 1982 in both systems.
The introduction of the pay-for-service sys-
tem at main canal, village, and farmer lev-
els undoubtedly influenced the decline in
water diverted and delivered per hectare
after reforms in the mid-1980s.
Two studies that employ extended be-
fore-and-after comparisons report constant
or small temporary drops in irrigation per-
formance for 2 to 5 years after transfer. In a
study of the large-scale Columbia Basin
Project in the USA, Svendsen and Vermil-
lion (1994) report a relatively constant over-
all irrigation efficiency (system-wide poten-
tial evapotranspiration divided by aggregate
net supply) of about 0.46 to 0.48 after IMT
in 1969. Conveyance efficiency dropped im-
mediately at transfer from 0.70 to 0.65 and
continued to decline to 0.62 by 1989 (attrib-
uted to deterioration stemming from the
cost-containment policy of the farmer
board). Total system irrigation supply per
hectare rose substantially for 2 years after
transfer and then dropped 10 percent over
15 years, from a high point of 0.77 ha-m/ha
in 1971. The rise in total irrigation supply
per hectare after transfer occurred despite
declining water delivery per hectare at farm
turnouts during the same time (as a result
of greater use of sprinklers and a shift to
crops that consume less water), indicating a
temporary lapse in main system manage-
ment. Over the long term since transfer,
farmers generally reported no change in the
quality or timeliness of irrigation delivery.
In Colombia, Garcés-Restrepo and Ver-
million (1994) report a 3-year leveling off of
long-term increases in irrigated area at the
time of management transfer in the Coello
district, which was then followed by further
increases. They attribute this to temporary
inefficiencies during adjustment to new
management.
In their study of the Columbia Basin
Project, Svendsen and Vermillion (1994) de-
veloped an equity index for comparing rela-
tive water supply between three branches in
the system, each managed by a different18
farmer irrigation district. The study showed
no change in equity for 6 years after the
transfer, followed by a gradual improve-
ment. The index was 1.15 (i.e., a 15% differ-
ence between branches with the highest and
lowest relative water supply) for 1969–75.
The index then declined to 1.03 to 1.10 in
the late 1970s and early 1980s (i.e., equity
had improved).
In a post-transfer case study of a sys-
tem in the terai of Nepal, Rana et al. (1994)
report that irrigation discharge increased
fourfold after substantial transfer-related
desilting and repair work was done by
farmers. Without comparisons with other
systems that did not have physical repair
work or that did not have IMT, it is impos-
sible to distinguish between the effects of
physical repairs and the effects of manage-
ment transfer. Mishra and Molden (1996)
found that on the West Gandak scheme in
Nepal inflow increased from 2.2 m
3/s to 7.9
m
3/s after transfer, relative to a design ca-
pacity of 8.5 m
3/s. However, improvement
is primarily explained by the effects of a
major desiltation, which was part of the
transfer program. Without a long-term com-
parison before and after transfer, it is diffi-
cult to know whether similar levels of dis-
charge might have been achieved before the
transfer. In the Bhairawa-Lumbini ground-
water irrigation project in Nepal, it is re-
ported that farmers became cost-conscious
after the transfer and reduced waste of wa-
ter, resulting in a 50 percent drop in water
consumption per hectare even though the
price of water was reduced by 40 to 50 per-
cent at the same time (Olin 1994).
Maintenance
Regarding system maintenance, studies on
lift irrigation in Indonesia and Senegal re-
port an acceleration in deterioration of
pump set equipment for lift irrigation after
turnover of equipment and networks to
management by farmer organizations. In
Indonesia, this was attributed to lack of lo-
cal knowledge, skills, and spare parts
(Johnson and Reiss 1993). In Senegal, farm-
ers continued to maintain the network
while pump set equipment deteriorated, in-
dicating a shortage of skills, spare parts,
and cash rather than lack of farmer motiva-
tion (Wester, During, and Oorthuizen 1995).
Although the Indonesia study substantiated
the finding with data on pump operating
hours and ratios of irrigated versus design
area, the Senegal study relied only on re-
ports of breakdowns.
In their study in Colombia, Vermillion
and Garcés-Restrepo (1996) conducted a de-
tailed post-transfer maintenance survey of
the Coello and Saldaña irrigation systems in
1994. They found that 68 percent of all irri-
gation structures for conveyance and distri-
bution in Coello were fully functional and
30 percent were partially functional. In
Saldaña, 48 percent of all structures were
fully functional and 44 percent were par-
tially functional. In Coello, 80 percent of
farmers interviewed in a stratified random
sample stated that maintenance of irrigation
structures was the same after IMT as before;
15 percent said it was better afterward. In
Saldaña, 70 percent said it was the same; 10
percent said it was better. The post-transfer
study design provides evidence that satis-
factory performance can be sustained for at
least 25 years after transfer, but it does not
show whether performance levels rose or
fell as a result of transfer.
For their study of the 230,000-hectare
Columbia Basin Project, USA, Svendsen and
Vermillion (1994) relied on secondary data
about maintenance from technical audits
conducted every 2 years by the Bureau of
Reclamation.
2 Between 1973 and 1977, there
were only five “category 2” recommenda-
2The Bureau of Reclama-
tion regional offices con-
ducted technical audits
of systems after transfer.
These audits involved
on-site inspection of all
physical structures and




rated according to the
degree of urgency of the
need for repairs.19
tions by auditors, which stated “important
preventative maintenance needed.” By
1980–84 there were 20 such recommenda-
tions. During the entire post-transfer period,
no “category 1” recommendations (“urgent
remedial maintenance required”) were re-
ceived. This suggests that cost-cutting mea-
sures may be compromising the quality of
maintenance over time, while still holding
the line against breakdowns.
In short, five of the cited studies re-
ported that after transfer of management
the irrigation structures deteriorated and
one study reported that their condition re-
mained the same (Vermillion and Garcés-
Restrepo 1996). Four studies (in India, Sri
Lanka, and Nigeria) reported an increase in
maintenance investment and activity after
transfer. None of these were among the
studies that reported deterioration in the
condition of structures. Accelerated deterio-
ration of infrastructure is most often re-
ported in pump irrigation schemes, where
government subsidies are withdrawn (such
as in Senegal, Bangladesh, and Indonesia).
Favorable maintenance conditions are re-
ported in locations where the economic
value of irrigated agriculture is relatively
high (such as in the USA and Colombia).
Most evidence on impacts on the
performance of irrigation O&M is based on
either qualitative reports or post-transfer
data for only 3 to 5 years. The limited data
that exist mostly indicate either positive or
no effects on O&M performance, though
there is some evidence that a temporary
downturn in performance sometimes occurs
immediately after IMT. Post-transfer
reductions in the amount of water delivered
per hectare are almost entirely seen either in
lift schemes or where water is charged
volumetrically.
There is another problem embedded in
several of the attempts to attribute improve-
ments in operational performance to man-
agement transfer. In many countries (such
as the Philippines, Nepal, Sri Lanka, and
Indonesia) transfer programs include physi-
cal rehabilitation or repair of irrigation in-
frastructure. In such cases, improvements in
operational performance may be more the
result of physical improvements than of
management reform. Studies by Wijayaratna
and Vermillion (1994) on the Philippines
and by Mishra and Molden (1996) on Nepal
both report improvements in operational
performance where transfer and rehabilita-
tion occurred together. In such cases, re-
search designs should include comparisons
with systems that have been transferred but
not rehabilitated or systems that have been
rehabilitated but not transferred.
Agricultural and Economic Productivity
The relationship between management trans-
fer and agricultural and economic productiv-
ity is less direct than the relationship between
transfer and O&M performance or financial
viability. Of the 25 papers presented at the
International Conference on Irrigation Man-
agement Transfer in Wuhan, China, in 1994
that contained data on performance, only 14
reported increases in cropping intensity (of
up to 97% in Andhra Pradesh) and 10 re-
ported increases in crop yields (Turral 1995).
Most reported improvements in both per-
formance measures, although the studies
provide no control comparisons to enable ex-
clusion of other causes of the observed im-
provements. The most common agricultural20
productivity measures mentioned in the lit-
erature on management transfer are area cul-
tivated, cropping intensity, and yield. The
most common economic measures mentioned
are gross value of output, net farm income
per hectare, and economic returns to irriga-
tion. Less data are available on economic pro-
ductivity than on agricultural productivity.
Table 4 summarizes the key findings in
the literature on impacts of management
transfer on agricultural and economic pro-
ductivity of irrigation systems. Seven stud-
ies reported increases in cropping intensity,
which are generally attributed to more re-
sponsive irrigation operations after transfer.
One study in Senegal (Wester, During, and
Oorthuizen 1995) reported declines in crop-
ping intensity, due to lack of management
skills, shortages of parts for pumps, and to
other problems with credit and marketing
related to structural reforms. Results for
crop yields were mixed: seven studies re-
porting increases in yields and six reporting
the same or lower yields after transfer.
Three studies reported increases in cul-
tivated area (Vietnam, Nigeria, and Colom-
bia); these increases were attributed to bet-
ter operations. Three reported more crop
diversification (India, Colombia, USA),
which was attributed in part to more flex-
ible water distribution practices and efforts
to conserve water delivered per hectare.
Regarding economic productivity, im-
provements in gross value of output or net
farm income after transfer were reported in
China (some locations), Egypt, Colombia,
and USA while there were two reports of de-
clines, in Sudan and China. Economic re-
turns to irrigation were reported to have de-
clined in some places in China and Mexico.
Research in Mexico has shown no significant
increase in area irrigated, cropping intensity,
or yields before and after management trans-
fer (Johnson 1996). Gross economic returns
have remained similar or have declined af-
ter transfer, being in the range of US$1,500
to $1,900/ha (Johnson 1996).
The Dominican Republic’s On-Farm
Water Management Project reported yield
increases of 40 percent. But it is not possible
from the data to distinguish the effects of
transfer from other factors, such as im-
proved irrigation infrastructure and cultiva-
tion practices (Sagardoy 1994). In the Coello
and Saldaña systems in Colombia, net in-
come rose from US$124/ha in 1984 to $153/
ha in 1994 (in 1988 peso equivalents), with
net income varying dramatically during the
period, however. Economic return to irriga-
tion was $12/100 m
3 in the Coello system in
1993 (with an irrigation efficiency of 73%,
i.e., water delivered/diverted) and $11/100
m
3 in Saldaña in 1993 (with an irrigation ef-
ficiency of 57%). However, no data on eco-
nomic productivity before transfer were
available. While this type of evidence sup-
ports the view that farmer organizations can
sustain relatively high levels of productivity
after transfer, it does not confirm that the
levels were primarily achieved or sustained
because of management transfer.
In a comparison of two localities in the
Senegal River Valley, researchers found that
in the Doue Region, privatization of irri-
gated agriculture support services was ac-
companied not only by a decline in crop-
ping intensities but by an expansion in irri-
gated area, from 620 hectares in 1985 to
1,070 hectares by 1991. Farmers shifted to
growing more of their crops only in the wet
season, partly due to rapidly rising input
prices and the greater complexity of dry
season irrigation after management transfer.
Similarly, in the Ile à Morphil region,
privatization led to a near doubling of irri-
gated area between 1985 and 1993 and an
increase in cropping intensity from 86 per-
cent during 1985–88 to 93 percent during
1990–93 (Wester, During, and Oorthuizen
1995).21
TABLE 4.
Reported impacts of irrigation management transfer on agricultural and economic productivity.
Study, country,
type of irrigation Agricultural productivity Economic productivity
Wijayaratna & Vermillion Increases in cropping intensity. n.a.
1994, Philippines, SI
Svendsen 1992 Rice yields increased by 4% to 4 t/ha in n.a.
Philippines, SI, LI both wet and dry seasons.a
Nguyen & Luong 1994 Cropping intensity increased from 170% to 250%. Annual incremental benefits increased by US$193/ha
Vietnam, LI 14% increase in area cropped. or by $182/ha net of increased O&M cost.
Yield increased 13%.
Johnson et al. 1995 Grain yields increased modestly. Cases of both increase and decrease in net income.
China, SI
IIMI & BAU 1996 Slight increase in cropping intensities. Small farmers (<1 ha) becoming a growing share of
Bangladesh, LI Mixed results for yields. pump owners and of expanding irrigated area
(58% to 63%, 1989–94).
Mishra & Molden 1996 Rice yields increased from 2.2 t/ha to 3.4 t/ha. n.a.
Nepal, SI Wheat yields increased from 1.6 t/ha  to 2.4 t/ha.
Kloezen 1996 Cropping intensities increased from 138% to 200%. Gross annual value of output between US$944/ha
Sri Lanka, SI and $1,136/ha after IMT.
Pant 1994 Cropping intensity increased from 143% to 162%. n.a.
India, LI Yields increased 10%.
Kalro & Naik 1995 Increases in cropping intensities and crop n.a.
India, SI, LI diversification. No change in yields.
Azziz 1994 10–16% increase in main crop yields. Increase in farm incomes by US$60/ha
Egypt, SI
Samad & Dingle 1995 High yields per unit of water in parastatal Gross margin three times higher in parastatal
Sudan, LI schemes (17 kg/100 m3) versus turned-over than in turned-over schemes. Productivity of land and
schemes (11 kg/100 m3). water higher in parastatal than in turned-over
schemes.
Maurya 1993; Musa 1994 Increase in dry-season cropped area by 80%. n.a.
Nigeria, SI
Wester, During, & Oorthuizen Cropping intensity rising and falling in different Cost of irrigated rice production increased 78%.
1995, Senegal, LI locations.
Vermillion & Garcés-Restrepo Rice yields of 6.5 t/ha, sustained after IMT. Net farm income rose 23%. Economic return to
1996, Colombia, SI, LI Cultivated area continued to expand. More crop irrigation was US$11–$12/100 m3 water. Gross value
diversification. of output increased 400%, 1983–91.
Garcés-Restrepo & Vermillion n.a. Cost of water relative to cost of rice production
1994, Colombia, SI, LI increased from 2.0% to 2.4%.
Johnson 1996 No change in cropping intensity or yields. Annual economic returns (US$1,500–$1,900/ha)
Mexico, SI remained same or declined.
Svendsen & Vermillion Shift to less water-intensive crops but more
1994 USA, SI due to changing water application  technology Average farm incomes rose 15% due to reduction in
and markets. water cost.
aAdjusted for diffences in nitrogen fertilizer use and rainfall.
Notes: SI= surface irrigation.  LI = lift irrigation.  n.a.= not available.22
As noted earlier, transfer of manage-
ment of distributary canals in the Kano
River Irrigation Project in Nigeria, resulted
in a significant improvement in water distri-
bution to tail-end areas and an overall im-
provement in cropping intensity. IMT was
introduced to the system largely because of
lack of government funds for irrigation
O&M, which led to a rapid deterioration of
the system, due to lack of maintenance, and
a new policy mandating financial autonomy
for the river basin authorities and large irri-
gation systems. In the 1992/93 season, fol-
lowing the transfer, 70 percent of distribu-
tary canals and 60 percent of field-channel
lengths were cleaned by farmer groups. As
a result, 10 percent more wheat and 8 per-
cent more maize were grown in the dry sea-
son compared with previous years. How-
ever, the absence of data for multiple years
prevents us from generalizing about trends
in productivity and the sustainability of
farmer investments in maintenance (Maurya
1993; Musa 1994).
Samad and Dingle (1995) compared the
performance of six pump schemes along the
White Nile in Sudan that were managed by
three types of organizations: farmer groups
(which had recently taken over manage-
ment), the White Nile Agricultural Corpora-
tion (a parastatal), and a contracting private
holding company. Wheat yields per unit of
water delivered were 11 kg/100 m
3 in
schemes managed by farmers and by the
private company and 17 kg/100 m
3 in
schemes managed by the parastatal. This
difference was attributed to the parastatal’s
better access to agricultural inputs.
The gross margin for the 1993/94 wheat
crop was US$0.34/100 m
3 in the turned-over
schemes, $1.09/100 m
3 in the parastatal
schemes, and only $0.09/100 m
3 in schemes
managed by the private company. Average
net farm income was US$18/ha in the turned
over schemes, $42/ha in the parastatal
schemes, and $7/ha in the schemes managed
by the private company. This was the first
year after transfer and the farmers and the
private company had little, if any, experience
in management before then. The private en-
tities paid more for inputs and had difficul-
ties in obtaining inputs on time.
Azziz (1994) reports comparative post-
transfer data that the transfer of mesqas in
Egypt led to a US$300/ha increase in aver-
age annual farm income. Pant’s (1994) study
of transfer of a public tube well in Uttar
Pradesh, India, documented a decrease in ir-
rigated area but increases in cropping inten-
sity and yields after the transfer. The average
irrigated area in rabi was 103 hectares dur-
ing 1990–92 (before transfer) and 60 hectares
during 1993–94 (after transfer). Cropping in-
tensities averaged 143 percent during the 2
years before transfer and 162 percent after-
ward. Yields for wheat, rice, and sugarcane
increased about 10 percent, indicating that
after transfer farmers preferred to intensify
production on the existing area rather than
expanding the area irrigated. Because of a
limited study period (2 years before and 2
years after), it is impossible to generalize
about trends. In the Paliganj Canal in Bihar,
India, as a result of management improve-
ments after transfer (mentioned above), irri-
gated area in the dry season increased from
3,613 hectares in 1990, before transfer, to
4,350 hectares after transfer in both 1992 and
1993 (Srivastava and Brewer 1994).
Uphoff (1992) reports the results of man-
agement transfer in the Gal Oya system in Sri
Lanka as improved equity of water distribu-
tion between head and tail areas, improved
maintenance, increased cropping intensity,
and higher yields. However, the study does
not present system-wide quantitative data
about these results and only refers to agricul-
tural productivity changes in a partial, anec-
dotal way. Attendance of farmers at meetings
is characterized as a good in itself .23
In a paper on transfer in several sys-
tems in the Philippines, Wijayaratna and
Vermillion (1994) report on improvements in
water distribution, expansion of irrigated
area, and increases in cropping intensities in
all study sites. The Banurbur system irri-
gated 486 hectares in the dry season before
transfer and 750 hectares afterward. The in-
crease continued for several years. The
Maramag system irrigated 524 hectares in
the dry season before transfer and 719 hect-
ares afterward. The Mahaba-Nasisi-Ogsong-
Hibiga (MNOH) system in Bicol added 390
hectares to wet season irrigation after trans-
fer, and a third crop was planted in several
blocks for the first time. However, the data
cover a short period, do not include infor-
mation on water supply, and provide in-
complete information on agricultural perfor-
mance.
In Vietnam, 4 years after the transfer of
a medium-scale river lift pump system in
the Red River delta, Nguyen and Luong
(1994) report that area irrigated increased to
1,600 hectares, from 934 hectares before
transfer, leading to a cropping intensity of
250 percent, compared with 170 percent be-
fore transfer. Management transfer of the
West Gandak scheme in Nepal led to yield
increases for rice from 2.2 to 3.4 t/ha and
for wheat from 1.6 to 2.4 t/ha. These gains
apparently resulted from a combination of
desiltation and management changes re-
lated to transfer. Annual incremental eco-
nomic benefits as a result of transfer were
estimated to be US$193/ha, or $182/ha after
accounting for an increase in O&M costs to
farmers (Mishra and Molden 1996).
Johnson, Svendsen, and Zhang (1994)
report that annual grain yield (wheat and
maize) per unit of water in two systems in
the north China plain increased steadily be-
tween 1973 and 1992 and the rate of in-
crease accelerated after the reforms in the
mid-1980s. Annual grain yield per unit of
water in Nanyao was 66 kg/100 m
3 in 1973,
70 kg/100 m
3 in 1982, and 135 kg/100 m
3 in
1992. Similarly, in Bayi, yields increased
from 28 kg/100 m
3 in 1973 to 65 kg/100 m
3
in 1982 and to 150 kg/100 m
3 in 1992. Data
on IMT impacts over such a long period are
rare and suggest that transfer had a positive
effect on yield returns to water, given the
parallel upturn in trend in both systems at
the time of transfer. However, rates of input
use or other factors were not documented.
In the Columbia Basin, USA, Svendsen
and Vermillion (1994) report that the reduc-
tion in water costs per unit area after trans-
fer enhanced average annual profitability of
irrigated farming by about 15 percent of av-
erage family incomes, assuming that real
net income remained the same in the 1980s
as in 1978. They note that this would in-
crease the gross margin on a typical 65-hect-
are farm by about US$1,600/yr. In general,
the literature most often reports positive
changes in agricultural and economic pro-
ductivity after transfer, although it is likely
that such changes often occur primarily be-
cause of factors other than irrigation man-
agement transfer.
A common problem is that most studies
that report marginal changes in agricultural
productivity do not attempt to control for
intervening variables such as changes in
rainfall or fertilizer application rates. Crop-
ping intensities and yields have tended to
rise gradually in many countries due to a
variety of factors. Similarly, economic pro-
ductivity is affected by broad economic
changes beyond management transfer, in-
cluding changes in prices, subsidies, and
markets. To attribute changes in agricultural
or economic productivity at least partly to
management transfer, it will be necessary
for researchers to incorporate potential in-
tervening variables into their analysis and
for the base of comparative information to
expand.24
Only a few studies refer to impacts of man-
agement transfer on the environment; these
are mostly qualitative. In Chile, water users’
associations, which took over control of
irrigation systems, reportedly became
empowered by transfer and the 1981 Water
Law Code, and they successfully pressured
paper factories to invest in pollution-
reducing equipment, by threatening to cut
off water to industrial users (Meinzen-Dick
et al. 1997).
On a field trip to Colombia in 1996, I
learned of efforts by farmers in the
transferred districts of Saldaña and Recio to
organize collective efforts to prevent further
deforestation in the water catchment areas
above their irrigation districts. Farmers
complained that deforestation over the
previous 10 to 15 years had dramatically
increased the silt load in the water diverted
into their schemes and had also caused a
steady decline in the stream flow at the
diversion weirs.
Yap-Salinas (1994) reports that irrigation
transfer in the Dominican Republic, through
the establishment of local organizations to
regulate land and water use, has halted and
reversed land degradation and loss of soil,
which in turn has reduced health risks
previously associated with waterlogging
from poor drainage. However, in the
absence of comparative data it is difficult to
assess the relative contributions of instal-
lation of new drainage facilities and
institutional reform.
In Senegal, it is reported that irrigation
management transfer has increased water-
logging and salinization due to poor
management practices by new and in-
experienced managers hired by farmer
associations. Because of the short time
covered, it is difficult to assess whether this
is a long-term problem or only a learning
adjustment.
I am not aware of any other studies
that attempt to attribute environmental
impacts to irrigation management transfer.
This may be because irrigation management
transfer is a relatively recent phenomenon
and environmental impacts normally take
several years to become apparent and
measurable.
There are numerous ways in which the
management of irrigation and drainage
could be modified to achieve emerging
environmental objectives such as reduction
in rates of soil erosion, salinity, water-
logging, pollution, and extraction of the
resource base (i.e., aquifers and water
basins). These changes may require regu-
lation of management practices at the farm,
scheme, and water basin levels. Given the
rising competition for water and degrada-
tion of water and land resources, there is a
need for impact studies to include
environmental measures, especially where
regulatory arrangements for resource
management are weak. In the future, net-
works of farmer-managed irrigation systems
will likely need to take responsibility for
local regulation of water basins. An
example is proposals to organize farmer
tube-well groups into a federated aquifer
group to regulate against depletion of
shallow aquifers in hard rock areas in South
Asia (Moench 1996). Where needed, transfer
programs should develop institutional
frameworks and prepare post-transfer
organizations to take up such respon-
sibilities.
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Evidence of impacts in the literature comes
in four basic types, listed generally from the
weakest to the strongest methods:
• qualitative reports of stakeholders
• post-transfer assessment of single cases
• with-and-without comparisons
• before-and-after comparisons
Table 5 summarizes the extent to which
different performance measures are in-
cluded in the literature reviewed here. The
most common performance indicators are
those about operations, which were in-
cluded in 25 of the 29 sources reviewed.
Twenty-one of the sources included data on
financial performance, and 18 studies re-
ported on agricultural performance. Only 12
studies reported on economic performance
after transfer. This is a significant deficiency
since perhaps the most pertinent concern
about management transfer is whether in-
cremental benefits to farmers outweigh
costs. The relatively few studies reporting
on maintenance after transfer partly reflects
the brief periods they cover. This shortcom-
ing makes it difficult to answer questions
about the long-term physical sustainability
of irrigation systems after transfer.
Table 6 displays data on basic types of
data collection methods used in the impact
assessment studies. The table indicates two
common tendencies: (1) considerable reli-
ance on secondary data collected from
agency offices (26 of the 29 studies) and (2)
a surprisingly frequent tendency to elicit
and report the perspectives of people hav-
ing a stake in the outcome of management
transfer (including farmers, agency staff,
and post-transfer management staff). How-
ever, the ability of most of these studies to
generalize about the prevalence of certain
perspectives is limited by a lack of system-
atic sampling, which was done in only nine
studies. Only eight of the studies made in-
dependent measurements of water distribu-
tion operations. In some studies, the heavy
reliance on secondary data, most often from
the implementing agency itself, may lead to
overestimation of performance levels, par-
ticularly before transfer, thus leading to un-
derestimation of any positive changes after
transfer. Since one of the frequent concerns
about management transfer is that it will
accelerate the rate of deterioration of infra-
structure, it is unfortunate that only five of
the studies involved direct and independent
inspection of irrigation infrastructure.
Table 7 summarizes information on key
analytical methods used in the impact stud-
ies. The most common analytical design
used is comparison of performance before
and after transfer, which was done in 24 of
the 29 studies cited. Given the great diver-
sity in conditions between irrigation
schemes, and the practical difficulties of ob-
taining large samples of schemes (for with-
and-without IMT comparisons), before-and-
after comparisons are a practical and com-
pelling approach. However, only 12 of the
24 studies that did before-and-after com-
parisons had data for more than 4 years. To
detect trends it is probably necessary to
have at least 6 years of performance data (3
years before and 3 years after IMT). A 10-
year time frame is a more desirable stan-
dard. Only three of the studies cited made
comparisons between schemes that had and
had not been transferred. None of them in-
cluded enough schemes for statistical com-
parison. Five of the studies used statistical
tests, others used only descriptive statistics.
Taken together, the literature on irriga-
tion management transfer does not yet al-
low analysts to draw strong conclusions
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TABLE 5.
Performance measures included in studies on impacts of irrigation management transfer.
Study and country Operational Financial Agricultural Economic Maintenance
Oorthuizen & Kloezen 1995—Philippines " " "
Wijayaratna & Vermillion 1994–Philippines " " "
Bagadion 1994–Philippines " "
Svendsen 1992–Philippines " " "
Johnson & Reiss 1993–Indonesia " " "
Nguyen & Luong 1994–Vietnam " "
Johnson et al. 1995–China " " " "
IIMI & BAU 1996–Bangladesh " " " " "
Olin 1994–Nepal " "
Rana et al. 1994–Nepal " "
Mishra & Molden 1996–Nepal " " " "
Kloezen 1996–Sri Lanka " " " "
Uphoff 1992–Sri Lanka " "
Pant 1994–India " " " "
Srivastava & Brewer 1994–India " " "
Rao 1994–India "
Shah et al. 1994–India "
Kalro & Naik 1995–India " "
Azziz 1994–Egypt " " " "
Samad & Dingle 1995–Sudan " " "
DSI, EDI, & IIMI 1996–Turkey " "
Maurya 1993; Musa 1994–Nigeria " " "
Wester, During, & Oorthuizen 1995–Senegal " " " "
Yap-Salinas 1994–Dominican Republic " "
Vermillion & Garcés-Restrepo 1996–Colombia " " " " "
Garcés-Restrepo & Vermillion 1994–Colombia " " "
Johnson 1996–Mexico " " " "
Svendsen & Vermillion 1994–USA " " " "
Farley 1994–New Zealand "
Total 25 21 18 12 927
TABLE 6.
Key data collection methods used in studies on impacts of irrigation management transfer.
Secondary Direct Direct
Study and country data from Farmer Systematic Stakeholder measurement inspection of
agency interviews sampling perspectives of operations structures
Oorthuizen & Kloezen 1995–Philippines " " " "
Wijayaratna & Vermillion 1994–Philippines " "
Bagadion 1994–Philippines " "
Svendsen 1992–Philippines "
Johnson & Reiss 1993–Indonesia " " "
Nguyen & Luong 1994–Vietnam "
Johnson et al. 1995–China " "
IIMI & BAU 1996–Bangladesh " " " " "
Rana et al. 1994–Nepal " " " "
Olin 1994–Nepal " " " "
Mishra & Molden 1996–Nepal " "
Kloezen 1996–Sri Lanka " " " " "
Uphoff 1992–Sri Lanka " "
Pant 1994–India " "
Srivastava & Brewer 1994–India " " " " "
Rao 1994–India " " "
Shah et al. 1994–India " " " " "
Kalro & Naik 1995–India " " "
Azziz 1994–Egypt " " " "
Samad & Dingle 1995–Sudan " " " " "
DSI, EDI, & IIMI 1996–Turkey "
Maurya 1993; Musa 1994–Nigeria " "
Wester, During, & Oorthuizen 1995–Senegal " " " " "
Yap-Salinas 1994–Dominican Republic "
Vermillion & Garcés-Restrepo 1996–Colombia " " " " " "
Garcés-Restrepo & Vermillion 1994–Colombia " " "
Johnson 1996–Mexico "
Svendsen & Vermillion 1994–USA " "
Farley 1994–New Zealand " "
Total 26 15 9 24 8 528
TABLE 7.
Key analytical methods used in studies of irrigation management transfer.
Compare Compare Performance
Study and country performance performance measured in
before and after with and without more than two Time series Statistical
IMT IMT transferred units analysisa tests used
Oorthuizen & Kloezen 1995–Philippines " "
Wijayaratna & Vermillion 1994–Philippines " "
Bagadion 1994–Philippines " "
Svendsen 1992–Philippines " " " "
Johnson & Reiss 1993–Indonesia " "
Nguyen & Luong 1994–Vietnam " "
Johnson et al. 1995–China " "
IIMI & BAU 1996–Bangladesh " " "
Rana et al. 1994–Nepal " "
Olin 1994–Nepal "
Mishra & Molden 1996–Nepal "
Kloezen 1996–Sri Lanka " "
Uphoff 1992–Sri Lanka "
Pant 1994–India " "
Srivastava & Brewer 1994–India "
Rao 1994–India "
Shah et al. 1994–India " "
Kalro & Naik 1995–India "
Azziz 1994–Egypt " "
Samad & Dingle 1995–Sudan " " "
DSI, EDI, & IIMI 1996–Turkey " "
Maurya 1993; Musa 1994–Nigeria " "
Wester, During, & Oorthuizen 1995–Senegal " " "
Yap-Salinas 1994–Dominican Republic "
Vermillion & Garcés-Restrepo 1996–Colombia " "
Garcés-Restrepo & Vermillion 1994–Colombia " " "
Johnson 1996–Mexico " " "
Svendsen & Vermillion 1994–USA " " "
Farley 1994–New Zealand " "
Total 24 3 15 12 5
aDefined as including data on at least five consecutive time periods.29
about cross-national trends in impacts, ei-
ther positive or negative. This is partly be-
cause of the highly varied nature of transfer
programs and irrigation contexts and the
many factors that can affect the perfor-
mance of irrigated agriculture. It is also due
to the lack of rigorous research methods
used, as noted above.
Conclusions
Evidence about impacts
Impacts of transfer reported in the literature
are mostly positive. This may be partly a
result of a bias in sites selected or the pos-
sibility that many authors are promoters of
the reforms. The most often reported posi-
tive impacts of transfer programs are reduc-
tion in the cost of irrigation to farmers and
to the government, enhanced financial self-
reliance of irrigation schemes, expansion of
service areas, reduction in the amount of
water delivered per hectare, and increases
in cropping intensity and yields. The most
frequently reported negative results of
transfer programs are increased costs to
farmers, failing financial viability of lift
schemes, and deteriorating infrastructure.
Reported impacts on government resource
allocation, total costs of irrigation, and envi-
ronmental stability are relatively rare in the
literature.
Quality of research methods
As noted above, much of the so-called evi-
dence about impacts is based upon qualita-
tive reports, without before-and-after or
with-and-without comparisons, without in-
dependent measurements with quantitative
data, without systematic sampling of farm-
ers, with short time frames, and with a fail-
ure to distinguish possible alternative
causes of the observed “impacts” of transfer.
Another weakness in the evidence is that
most reports mention only two or three in-
dicators of performance, so it is impossible
to assess tradeoffs between key performance
measures, such as changes in short-term fi-
nancial performance versus long-term main-
tenance.
Irrigation management transfer pro-
grams are probably more often adopted be-
cause of government funding constraints
than because of validated expectations
about enhanced performance. Transfer pro-
grams are sometimes promoted for philo-
sophical reasons. Considering the potential
far-reaching effects of this reform on the
livelihood of farmers and the sustainable
productivity of irrigation systems, it is vital
that much more rigorous and compelling
research methods to assess its real impacts
be adopted and that the results be assessed
comparatively.
It should be pointed out, however, that
while some performance indicators are rela-
tively easy to measure and analyze (such as
financial performance), others are moder-
ately difficult (such as O&M performance).
It is very difficult to make a compelling
analysis that can convincingly attribute
changes in agricultural and economic pro-
ductivity to management transfer because
there are so many potential determinants of
change in these measures. It may take sev-
eral years after management transfer to es-
tablish that an irrigation system is environ-
mentally sustainable and to determine the
extent to which transfer has influenced the
outcome. Nevertheless, since management30
transfer can potentially have a major impact
on the performance of irrigated agriculture
in developing countries, it is important that
researchers rise to the challenge of making
more careful assessments of its impacts.
Recommended improvements in
research methods
To overcome the shortcomings of studies to
date, the following principles should guide
future research on the impacts of irrigation
management transfer.
1. Wherever possible, studies should in-
clude a balanced core set of perfor-
mance indicators, including financial
performance, quality of O&M, agricul-
tural productivity, economic impacts,
and impacts on the environment.
2. Future studies should avoid excessive
dependence on data collected from sec-
ondary sources, such as agency offices.
Where such data are used, correspond-
ing measures should be sampled inde-
pendently (through farmer interviews
or remote sensing, for example) to vali-
date the data.
3. To enable generalization, farmers
should be selected through systematic
random sampling, normally stratified
according to location of fields relative
to irrigation headworks.
4. More extensive use should be made of
before-and-after interrupted time series
research designs, which include data
for at least 3 to 5 years before and 3 to
5 years after the occurrence of transfer,
to more firmly establish the timing of
impacts of transfer.
5. The preponderance of single case stud-
ies limits analysts’ ability to generalize
about impacts. Given the difficulty of
conducting detailed time-series analyses
in a large number of schemes, case
studies should be complemented by
surveys of 20 to 30 randomly selected
schemes where a smaller amount of
data is collected on core performance
measures.
6. For assessments of financial impacts,
both costs to the farmers and to the
government should be measured, as
well as changes in the total cost of irri-
gation.
7. Where transfer programs include im-
provements in irrigation infrastructure,
research studies should include with-
and-without comparisons with control
for the contending effects of physical
improvements and management re-
form.
8. Given the importance of documenting
the physical sustainability of irrigation
systems after transfer, impact studies
should include direct observations of
the physical condition and functionality
of irrigation infrastructure.
9. Assessments of agricultural impacts,
such as crop yields, should also mea-
sure potential alternative causes of
changes in yields, such as changes in
fertilizer application rates, rainfall pat-
terns, and technology or cultivation
practices. Statistical methods such as
analysis of variance and multiple re-
gression should be used to assess the
relative importance of different causal
factors of changes in agricultural pro-
ductivity.
10. Assessments of economic productivity
should compare changes in cost of irri-
gation to farmers with changes in the
value of agricultural output.31
11. Assessments of economic impacts
should also measure changes in poten-
tial alternative determinants of eco-
nomic productivity, such as prices of
inputs and crops, market conditions,
and subsidies. As with the assessment
of agricultural productivity, statistical
methods such as analysis of variance
and multiple regression should be used
to attempt to assess the relative impor-
tance of different causal factors of
changes in economic productivity.
12. Changes in agricultural or economic
productivity should be more clearly
linked to transfer by documenting the
nature and timing of effects of transfer
on changes in policies and procedures
for O&M and financing, and then relat-
ing O&M performance outcomes to ag-
ricultural productivity.
IIMI is currently developing and field-
testing a methodological guide for impact
assessment of irrigation management trans-
fer, which will soon be disseminated to re-
searchers and professionals involved in
management transfer around the world
(Vermillion et al. 1996).
Key issues for future research
Research to date and reports from practitio-
ners in international meetings favor the no-
tion that certain prerequisites are needed
before countries can expect to achieve suc-
cess with management transfer programs.
The most common are
• a clearly recognized and sustainable
water right and water service
• infrastructure that is compatible with
the water service and local manage-
ment capacities
• well-specified management functions
and assignment of authority
• effective accountability and incentives
for management
• arrangements for viable and timely con-
flict resolution
• adequate resources that can be mobi-
lized for irrigation management
The components most commonly lack-
ing in Asian countries tend to be clear wa-
ter rights, clearly designated lines of author-
ity between farmers and agencies, and effec-
tive accountability and incentive systems.
Research is needed on what common char-
acteristics occur in more successful cases of
management transfer. Such characteristics
include institutional arrangements of trans-
fer, compatibility of socioeconomic contexts
for collective action, maturity of supporting
local institutions (especially for resource al-
location and conflict resolution), and sup-
port services for irrigated agriculture. Ac-
tion research is needed that includes all six
of the above hypothesized essential ele-
ments in locations where they do not yet
occur.
For several years, water users’ associa-
tions have been promoted as both a govern-
ing and a management body for irrigation
systems. Community organizers have
helped water users’ associations to develop
constitutions and bylaws, select leaders, ap-
prove plans and budgets, and apply sanc-
tions. Water users’ associations then directly
manage operations, maintenance, and fi-
nances. This model is probably not well
suited for management at higher levels of
larger systems or in more complex manage-
ment environments. Accountability between
farmers and leaders, especially in finances,
is often weak, and water users’ associations
generally do not have professional staff. As32
a result, many conclude that transfer can
only occur at small scales of management.
Action research is needed on alternative
nongovernmental management models that
are expected to be more capable of manag-
ing medium-scale or large irrigation sys-
tems, such as irrigation districts or mutual
companies. In all cases, researchers should
apply compelling analytical methods to
document the impacts of reform.
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